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Trends in Communist Propaganda

28 Aug 74

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# **TRENDS**


**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

28 AUGUST 1974

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## C Y P R U S

## USSR STATEMENT URGES INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, GUARANTEES

In the fourth Soviet Government statement on Cyprus since the 15 July coup, Moscow on 22 August launched its first initiative in its efforts to move the problem away from the "NATO family" to a UN forum which would provide the USSR with a visible role. The two new ingredients of the Soviet proposal were, first, a call for an international conference within the UN framework with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, all members of the Security Council, and "possibly" other participation, particularly from among the nonaligned; and, second, a system of "appropriate, effective guarantees" of Cyprus' independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity provided by the Security Council permanent members either "jointly or in parallel." The statement laid down no conditions or time frame for holding such a conference.

The statement was otherwise consistent with Moscow's established line on the Cyprus problem: It again accused NATO "militarist circles" of attempting to dismember the island and convert it into an alliance stronghold. It repeated criticism of the "bankrupt so-called" guarantees "imposed" on Cyprus under the Zurich-London agreements; it indirectly criticized the Geneva talks of the three guarantor states in charging that talks "within the closed circle" of NATO states could bring new dangers to the Cypriots; and it called for "effective measures" to protect Cyprus from outside interference and insure the withdrawal of "all foreign troops." The statement did seem to be alluding to Turkey in asserting that the Cyprus problem could not be solved "either with the aid of military force or by way of political diktat."

Soviet media had laid the foundation for both new elements in the government statement. Thus the Geneva talks had been continually denigrated as taking place within "narrow NATO circles" and excluding Cypriot Government representation; the government proposal called for "a representative forum of states, mirroring the political image of the modern world" and including the "immediate participation of representatives from the Cyprus Republic." The call for guarantees was foreshadowed in the 15 August PRAVDA Observer article, which advanced an imprecise idea of UN guarantees. On the same day the government statement was released, Moscow reported a Belgrade TV interview with Greek Foreign Minister Mavros in which he favored guarantees by the Security Council members and "one qualified representative of the nonaligned countries, for instance, Yugoslavia."

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REACTION TO PROPOSAL Coverage of Western reaction to the proposal has highlighted qualified Greek and Greek Cypriot approval while anticipating that Washington, London and Ankara would withhold endorsement. TASS on the 24th reported Greek Foreign Minister Mavros as saying that his government accepted "on the whole" the proposal and would ask for "some explanations" from the Soviets. Following a meeting between Mavros and the Soviet envoy on the 26th, Moscow radio that day announced the Greek Government's official acceptance, again "on the whole," noting Greek concerns that the conference should work out "specific steps" for solving the crisis. TASS also noted the approval of Cypriot "Acting" President Kliridhis on the 25th following talks with Karamanlis in Athens, and reported from Nicosia on the 27th that Kliridhis told a press conference he agreed "in principle" with the Soviet proposal. Later that day TASS reported the Cyprus Government's official acceptance. And TASS on the 28th reported that Makarios, in an Athens newspaper interview, said he "fully" backed the Soviet initiative, ignoring his statement that it would be preferable not to include nonaligned countries in the consultations.

Expectations of some negative replies were forecast as early as 23 August when TASS noted that the issue of consultations would depend on the position of "Western countries who until now [have] tried in every way to restrict the discussion of the Cyprus problem to the narrow framework of NATO." PRAVDA deputy editor Vladimir Yermakov, speaking on the Moscow domestic service observers' round-table program on 25 August, saw "NATO circles looking for an excuse to reject the proposal."

Moscow completely ignored any mention of the Soviet proposal in reporting U.S. State Department spokesman Robert Anderson's 26 August statement. Anderson said that the "preliminary assessment" was that "still another forum would not be useful," but Washington was willing to consider any proposal acceptable to all parties. TASS on the 27th merely reported Anderson as saying that the United States favored the Geneva talks.

Reporting Turkey's rejection, TASS in a Paris-dated dispatch on the 27th attributed to AFP a report that Foreign Minister Gunes told newsmen that Turkey believed a conference of the "so-called guarantor nations" and representatives of the "two communities on Cyprus" would be more feasible than an international conference proposed by the Soviet Union "and seconded" by Greece and by Kliridhis.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW ATTACKS SUGGESTIONS FOR U.S. BASE IN ISRAEL

In addition to the stereotyped Soviet charges that NATO is seeking to make Cyprus its base in the Mediterranean, Moscow commentators have taken note of the "search for new NATO bases" in case Greek naval facilities are withdrawn. Moscow wasted little time reacting to a suggestion floated in an Israeli paper as well as by Israeli military commentator Herzog in a radio interview on the 19th favoring Israeli consideration of an offer of a naval base to the United States to replace those in Greece. A series of commentators have described the idea as indicative of Israel's desire to establish firmer cooperation with NATO and win support for its objective of undermining a Mideast settlement. Thus PRAVDA's Demchenko, observing on the 22d that the offer "so far" had not been made officially, asserted that Israel was concerned by steps taken by "some Western countries" to normalize relations with the Arabs and would like, through the offer of a base for the Sixth Fleet, to enlist NATO support for its "anti-Arab" policy.

Along similar lines, PRAVDA political observer Mavevskiy, remarking in a Moscow domestic service feature on the 24th that Israel hoped its "aggressive plans" regarding Lebanon would be understood by NATO countries, added that it was not for nothing that Israel was ready to make its territory available for NATO and U.S. military bases. And IZVESTIYA observer Mikhaylov, in the Moscow radio roundtable program on the 25th, linked the "synchronized" suggestions from Israel with NATO's alleged interest in Cyprus as a base and "transloading point" for military supplies to Israel. Moscow has brought the issue before the Arabs in Arabic-language comment on Radio Peace and Progress, and a Gerasimov foreign-language commentary on the 26th noted "stormy" Arab reaction to the idea.

**TURKISH FACILITIES** TASS on the 23d noted without comment that Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit, asked in a New York TIMES interview whether Turkey would provide port facilities for the Sixth Fleet in the event Greek facilities were withdrawn, stated that "we should be able to compensate for any weakness that ensues as a result of Greek withdrawal" from NATO's military structure. Two days earlier, TASS had briefly noted a Turkish Foreign Ministry denial of reports that Turkey was planning to give the United States a base in the northeastern part of Cyprus.

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## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW NOTES ROCKEFELLER APPOINTMENT, SEES CONTINUITY

Moscow has reacted favorably to the selection of Nelson Rockefeller as the U.S. vice presidential nominee, interpreting the event as further evidence of the Ford Administration's inclination to pursue the foreign policy goals of its predecessor. With Rockefeller a known quantity, Moscow's comment on the nomination has reflected less uncertainty than was apparent in the initial assessments of the new president. Rockefeller's close association with Secretary of State Kissinger and his reputation as a "liberal" have been repeatedly cited as indications of the role he is likely to play in the new administration. In the meantime, Moscow has continued to stress other signs of continuity in U.S. foreign policy, and has begun to present some news that reflects negatively on the last administration.

Moscow has devoted considerable attention to reporting the speculation that has been voiced in the United States on the role that Rockefeller may play in the new administration. He has been presented as a powerful political figure in his own right, the leader of the "liberal" wing of the Republican party, and a man of vast experience in both domestic and foreign policy. It has been reported that he may "play a more active role in issues of foreign policy" than his predecessor, and also that he may head the President's "domestic council." One commentator, PRAVDA correspondent Strelnikov on 22 August, saw significance in the fact that the first person he met when he came to Washington for the announcement was Secretary of State Kissinger. Along with stressing Rockefeller's personal qualities, Soviet reportage and comment has tended to upgrade the importance of the office. A number of commentaries have noted that three of the last seven vice presidents have become president, and one commentary on the Moscow Domestic Service on 24 August asserted that the post "plays at present an enormous part in the balance of forces in the country."

In the meantime, Moscow has continued to express confidence that the basic orientation of U.S. foreign policy remains committed to the goals outlined and pursued by the Nixon Administration. In addition to noting with approval President Ford's statements and actions in this regard, it has stressed the broad bipartisan support which the policy of detente has received in Congress. Statements of support for a policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union reportedly given in a TASS interview by Senators Scott and



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Mansfield were reported by TASS on 23 August. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA quoted Averell Harriman to much the same effect in an interview reported on 21 August.

Moscow has begun to report some unfavorable news about the Nixon Administration which could be read as a limited and indirect endorsement of the expediency of the change of administration. An article in NOVOYE VREMYA, No. 33, on 16 August, for example, gave a brief account of the Watergate burglary, and noted that "Richard Nixon was accused of attempting to cover up the story," and also that he "was accused of abuse of power." The Moscow domestic service on 28 August noted that Press Secretary terhorst had denied reports that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had imposed extraordinary controls over military communications during the last days of the Nixon regime "in case the White House would have to be prevented from giving any unsanctioned orders to military units."

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## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

## ROMANIAN ANNIVERSARY: INDEPENDENCE, TIES WITH MOSCOW NOTED

A show of firmness without truculence was the stance adopted by Romania for the 30th anniversary of Romanian liberation held in Bucharest on 22 August. Obviously concerned to refurbish the image of Romanian-Soviet friendship, put under fresh doubt in recent months by Western rumors of renewed Soviet pressure for a corridor across Romania in connection with Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria, Ceausescu modified his customary reassertions of independence by including in his public declarations warmer praise than usual of the Soviet Union's past assistance. The Soviet Union responded in kind, honoring the celebration with Kosygin's presence, and showing Ceausescu some personal warmth in its official message of greetings. Both sides avoided the controversial issue of a new world conference of communist parties in their official statements and in their media comment on the festivities.

Kosygin was the highest ranking leader from a communist country attending, although GDR State Council Chairman Stoph carried equal protocol standing. Politburo-level figures led the delegations from East Europe, the PRC, Mongolia, Cuba, and the DPRK. The DRV delegation was led by alternate Central Committee member Ha Ke Tan. Hungary was represented by Central Committee member and deputy premier Lazar, while Belgrade was represented by Yugoslav Vice President Stambolic.

In 1969, the last quinquennial, the Soviet Union was represented by Deputy Premier Novikov, China by its ambassador in Bucharest. In 1964, the Soviet Union was represented by Mikoyan, China by the present delegate, Li Hsien-nien. As in 1969, none of the foreign delegates gave speeches, thus avoiding an airing of Sino-Soviet differences.

The Bucharest radio carried a relatively effusive account of a meeting between Kosygin and Ceausescu on the 21st, and Ceausescu contributed an anniversary article to PRAVDA on the 22d--his first since 7 May 1971 when he wrote an article for the 50th anniversary of the Romanian Communist Party. The message sent by the Soviet leaders to their Romanian counterparts contained a mixture of cordiality with reminders of Bucharest's ties with the USSR, the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. The observance of the Romanian anniversary in Moscow on the 20th was attended by CPSU Politburo member Polyanskiy.

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CEAUSESCU In his Grand National Assembly speech on the 22d,  
SPEECH Ceausescu underscored "the particular importance of  
our relations of cooperation with the Soviet Union,  
which is occupying first place" in Romania's international economic  
relations, adding that Bucharest would "act unabatedly" to expand  
cooperation within CEMA. The speech was summarized at length in  
PRAVDA on the 23d. He also noted the historical importance of  
the "victory of the socialist revolution in China and the establish-  
ment of the PRC." In his anniversary speech in 1969, he had  
spoken in broader, more evenhanded terms of the role played in post-  
World War II developments by "the great successes in building  
communism" and "the victory of the people's revolution in China"  
and in other countries.

Ceausescu took particular pains, in his present speech, both to hail  
the successes of the Red Army in triggering the 23 August 1944  
insurrection against Antonescu and to underscore the participation  
of Romanian troops with the Soviet forces in the further liberation  
of Eastern Europe. Thus he recalled that Romanian soldiers "joined  
the glorious Soviet armies" in the liberation of Hungary and  
Czechoslovakia, adding that these "joint battles" had laid the  
groundwork for fraternal cooperation between the Soviet and  
Romanian armies and peoples. Ceausescu pointedly recalled also  
that PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA in August 1944 had stressed the importance  
of the entry of Romania into the war against Hitler and its contri-  
bution to the liberation of the Balkans.

At the same time, the Romanian leader's speech included reminders  
that his country, past and present, was not exclusively dependent  
on Soviet help. Thus, in hailing the successes of the Soviet  
armies, "which bore the brunt of World War II," he stressed in  
the same breath that "important successes were also won by the allied  
armies," which hastened the fall of Germany. The Romanian Communist  
Party's "great merit," he added, lay in the fact that "it knew  
how to take advantage of favorable national and international  
circumstances" in carrying out its "decisive" liberation move.  
Ceausescu predictably included in his speech the standard pro-  
fession of cooperation with "all" socialist countries and with  
all countries of the world on the basis of mutual regard for  
sovereignty, equality, independence, and noninterference. And  
somewhat defensively, he affirmed Bucharest's "unabated" cooperation  
not only with the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states but  
with the armies of "all the socialist countries and those of other  
friendly states."

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CEAUSESCU'S  
PRAVDA ARTICLE

The Romanian leader's article in PRAVDA on 22 August was, in most respects, an abridged version of his anniversary address in Bucharest the same day. Entitled "30 Years Along the Road of Free, Socialist Development of Romania" and printed across the lower part of pages 4 and 5, the article was carried in lengthy excerpts by AGERPRES and briefly summarized by TASS the same day. AGERPRES said the article had been "reproduced" in Romanian dailies, also on the 22d. Like his speech, Ceausescu's article included praise for the key role of the USSR in Romanian foreign affairs, references to sovereignty and "all" socialist countries, and mention of CEMA. However, the article avoided a mention of China and Albania by dispensing with an enumeration of the socialist countries. It also did not raise the subject of the Warsaw Pact.

As in his speech, Ceausescu stressed that his party is "creatively applying the general laws of socialism to the concrete realities of Romania"--phraseology also employed in the Soviet leaders' anniversary message to the Romanian leaders on the same day. The summary of Ceausescu's article by TASS on the 22d noted that Romania's 30-year progress in all areas had been made possible through its own efforts as well as "cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

SOVIET  
MESSAGE

The message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to Ceausescu and Premier Manescu, broadcast in full by Moscow radio in Romanian on the 22d, was slightly warmer than the 1969 Soviet message in extending greetings "to you personally" as well as to the Romanian party, state, and people. At the same time, in praising Romania's socialist successes, the message stressed that successful socialist building is due not only to "creative use of the general laws of socialism in the concrete conditions of each country" but to "unity in action and internationalist solidarity of the fraternal parties and countries" based on Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism. The message also recalled that the Red Army's successes "created favorable conditions" for the 23 August 1944 Romanian insurrection. This year's message also stressed the Warsaw Pact and CEMA as vehicles of cooperation, noting Moscow's determination to "strengthen Soviet-Romanian cooperation both within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and along bilateral lines." The message also stressed interparty coordination in its closing statement: "Long live the multilateral cooperation between the CPSU and the Romanian Communist Party, and between the Soviet and Romanian peoples." By contrast, the 22 August 1969 Soviet message had said: "Long live the friendship and cooperation between our countries and our peoples, and may they grow stronger."

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KOSYGIN-CEAUSESCU  
MEETING

AGERPRES on 21 August carried a fairly long and effusive report of talks that day between Ceausescu and Soviet Premier Kosygin. The full account of this meeting was matched two days later by AGERPRES' lengthy report of talks on the 22d between the Romanian leader and China's Li Hsien-nien. Both reports characterized the respective talks as having taken place in an atmosphere of "warm and comradely friendship." The AGERPRES report of the Kosygin-Ceausescu meeting said the two leaders voiced "full satisfaction at the steadily strengthening and developing relations of lasting friendship" between the two peoples, cemented in war and in building socialism and communism. The shorter TASS report early on the 22d was more restrained in noting that "the conviction was expressed that the friendly cooperation" between the two countries "will develop further" on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism and "strengthening the unity of the socialist community."

## PRC USES ANNIVERSARY TO UNDERLINE SOLIDARITY WITH ROMANIA

Peking's high-level attention to the 30th Romanian liberation anniversary is comparable to that accorded the 20th anniversary in 1964. Attention included a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, a widely publicized PRC leaders' message, and the sending of a party-government delegation led by Politburo member Li Hsien-nien to the Bucharest festivities. Li had also led the delegation in 1964, but on the 25th anniversary in 1969 the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest headed the delegation. Peking failed to publicize the Chinese leaders' message on the 25th anniversary, as it did last year. And no PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial has marked the date since 1964.

Peking gave much attention to the activities of the Li delegation in Bucharest, playing up friendly Chinese relations with Romania and other countries. NCNA reported both of Li's meetings with Ceausescu, employing on one occasion an unusually effusive formulation on the atmosphere of talks between the two sides, adding "very" to the usual "cordial and friendly atmosphere." Peking reported specific meetings Li held with delegates from the DPRK, Egypt, Zambia and with Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, and cited his presence at major anniversary conclaves in Bucharest, but it carefully sidestepped reference to Soviet Premier Kosygin and other Soviet bloc delegates, noting only that "delegates of some other countries" were also attending the celebrations.

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The Chinese leaders' message, signed as last year by Mao, Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai, lauded the achievements in foreign and domestic policy by the Romanian CP "headed by Comrade Ceausescu," and testified to China's solidarity with the independent-minded Romanians. It predictably highlighted Romania's opposition to outside interference and defense of national independence and state sovereignty, gave special mention to the significance of Ceausescu's visit to China in 1971, and affirmed glowingly that Sino-Romanian friendship is based on "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and can stand any test."

Similar comment marked the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and remarks by Chinese spokesmen at anniversary receptions in Peking. Teng Hsiao-ping led Chinese leaders attending the Romanian Ambassador's traditional 23 August reception, and Politburo member Wu Te spoke at the conclave. While high-ranking Chinese leaders have attended the reception in recent years--Li Hsien-nien last year and Chou En-lai in 1969--NCNA did not report remarks by Chinese officials on either of those occasions.

**BACKGROUND** The rise in Peking's attention towards Romania comes in the wake of recent high-level Chinese consultations with visiting Romanian leaders in Peking: On 9 August Li Hsien-nien received the Romanian foreign minister and on 14 August Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and Politburo Member Chen Hsi-lien talked with the visiting Romanian army chief of staff. These consultations seem to reflect mutual desires for support in the present context of Soviet-sponsored moves to convene an international communist conference.

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## VIETNAM

Recent Vietnamese communist propaganda has contained elements which suggest that there has been a new DRV decision on policy regarding South Vietnam. Most notably, the revival in Hanoi media on 15 August of the commitment to an urban struggle in the South to "topple" the Thieu administration was followed the next day by an unsigned article in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which had a strikingly authoritative ring and which could be read as providing ideological justification for an escalation of the struggle in South Vietnam. During the past week, low-level PRG propaganda has reiterated the revived formulation on Thieu's overthrow and setting up a new government in Saigon to implement the Paris agreement. This formulation represents a significant departure from past propaganda which--in the spirit of the peace accord's call for GVN-PRG cooperation--had maintained at least the facade of attempting to pressure the Saigon government to change its policies rather than ousting it from power.\*

## DRV ARMY PAPER DEFENDS PARTY'S THEORIES ON REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The 16 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, entitled "An Attitude Toward War," appears to be an ideological treatise for party cadres rationalizing the North Vietnamese party's policies in pursuing its revolutionary goals. The thrust of its argument is that it is imperative to press revolutionary liberation wars in the face of U.S. "counterrevolutionary" efforts, but the article is couched in theoretical language and spells out no new policies for Vietnam. Both the article's theoretical content and its length--covering a full page in the paper--are unusual for an unattributed article. Its effort to justify party policies is underlined by a prefatory quotation--in fact taken from the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) 1960 statutes--which affirms that the VWP uses Marxism-Leninism as a guide to its actions, applying its principles to the "realities of the Vietnamese revolution" and opposing both "experimental and dogmatic manifestations" and all "revisionist arguments."

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\* Initial propaganda references to overthrowing Thieu are discussed in the TRENDS of 21 August 1974, pages 14-17.

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That the article was clearly intended for domestic consumption is shown by the fact that it was not carried in any form by either Hanoi radio or VNA. Moreover, the article appears to have been meant as a document for study by party cadres. The prefatory quotation from the party statutes includes the statement that the party "attaches great attention to extensively and constantly educating all party members and all people."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article presses Hanoi's conventional view that imperialism, particularly the United States, is the true cause of war and that U.S. "counterrevolution" must be opposed in "just wars" of liberation. The article candidly acknowledges the "sacrifices" entailed in the Vietnamese revolution but argues, in a fashion which could support future struggles as well as justify the past, that the sacrifices were necessary and that "our people" could not "enjoy happiness and peace, and have the conditions for building socialism" without the restoration of "genuine independence and freedom."

Assessing the international implications of its arguments, the article repeats the line--most notably voiced by VWP First Secretary Le Duan in his major February 1970 article--that there is no contradiction between the prevention of a world war and the acceleration of revolutionary wars. It notes that "revolutionaries" never advocate "annihilating American imperialism through a new world war," but that "we cannot and should not prevent national liberation wars and revolutionary civil wars."

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN underlines the "duty of Marxists" to give "material and moral assistance" to "just" struggles, but its advice is couched in theoretical terms without specifying which "Marxists" are meant. The article could be read as a justification for North Vietnam's support of the war in the South; it could also be a reference to Hanoi's major allies. It should be noted, however, that the article contains none of the clear allusions to dissatisfaction with Soviet and Chinese performance on aid which have appeared in the past. Although Hanoi has rarely publicized misgivings about its allies support since the January 1973 peace agreement, warnings against U.S. efforts to use "detente" with big countries to limit support for Vietnam have been voiced--for example, in a series of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles in October and November 1973 by the authoritative military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant).\*

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\* For a discussion of the Chien Binh articles, see the TRENDS of 25 October 1973, pages 17-18, and 12 December 1973, pages S1-S5.



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While the 16 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article is focused on the problem of war it also explicitly states that "Marxists" do not rule out "the possibility of holding peace talks to settle a war." Like other passages in the article, this could be read either as an explanation of past Hanoi actions or as guidance for the future. Suggesting the limitations on any negotiations, the article maintains that "the conclusion of a war must be linked with the defense of and respect for the national independence and freedom and the interests of the oppressed class."

#### PRG RADIO SAYS WAR WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS THIEU HOLDS POWER

The explicit communist commitment to overthrow Thieu and set up a new government, revived in the North Vietnamese press on 15 August, is not known to have been repeated by Hanoi media since the 19th but has appeared in several Liberation Radio commentaries in the past week. The main vehicle for the formulation has been a series of Liberation Radio commentaries which commemorated--as Front propaganda does each year--the anniversaries of uprisings in South Vietnamese cities in 1945. Broadcast between 22 and 25 August, the commentaries claim that the people of Hue, Saigon, and Danang are determined to topple the Thieu regime and set up an administration that will implement the peace agreement and insure the right to a decent life, democracy, peace, and national concord. In addition, an appeal attributed to Front youth organizations in Saigon-Gia Dinh, dated 15 August but broadcast on the 25th, expressed the determination of the youths to overthrow Thieu.

The new formulation was raised in a different context in a 27 August Front broadcast of an "article," attributed to the commentator Binh Nhut (Private First Class), which contended that "as long as Mr. Thieu is in power, the war will continue." The broadcast asserted that the Paris agreement "is still valid," despite the continued fighting, but that Thieu is distorting the accord and refusing to implement it. Binh Nhut went on to claim that the "masses" will bring about Thieu's ouster "with their resolute struggle" and that the South Vietnamese Government troops "will certainly play an active and direct role in the common struggle of the compatriots to topple this bloodthirsty man."

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## BURMA

## BURMESE CP ANNIVERSARY REPORT HIGHLIGHTS URBAN STRUGGLE

The Burmese CP Chairman's annual party anniversary report on 15 August gave greatly increased attention to mass movements in urban areas while continuing to stress the importance of armed struggle in the countryside. The report, broadcast by the China-based clandestine radio station Voice of the People of Burma, hailed the 35th anniversary of the party with a more optimistic assessment of the overall revolutionary situation than last year, singling out recent urban strikes and demonstrations in Rangoon and other cities as prime contributors to the current "favorable situation." The report also positively noted the significance of recently stepped up revolutionary movements in neighboring Thailand and elsewhere abroad, concluding optimistically that 1974 represents "the best year for people's revolution."

In sharp contrast to last year's complaints over the limits to Burmese CP expansion because of a serious lack of qualified cadre, this year's report lauded the party's allegedly rising influence with urban classes as well as its traditional hold over the armed insurgents in the countryside. Claiming that the Ne Win government is endeavoring to isolate and suppress separately the rural armed resistance and the urban mass movements, the report promised a joint urban-rural attack against the "fascist Ne Win-San Yu clique." It particularly encouraged workers, students and government employees in the cities to assist the people's war in the countryside by persisting in strikes and demonstrations, adding that the rural insurgents should continue to step up the "people's revolutionary war" to achieve military victory and seize political power.

PEKING GREETING,  
MOSCOW REACTION

Peking marked the anniversary with a message from the CCP Central Committee--the first such greetings since the Burmese CP's 30th anniversary in 1969, a pattern consistent with Peking's recent policy of usually marking only quinquennials and decennials. Reflecting the changes in PRC foreign policy since 1969, the message omitted the previous message's attack on the "reactionary Ne Win clique" and its denunciation of "Burmese reactionaries" for following the United States, dropping all reference to the Burmese government or to Burmese internal affairs. It focused instead on generalized praise of the party's opposition to "imperialism, revisionism and reaction" and on the prevailing "excellent" international situation of worldwide resistance to the two superpowers.

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While praising past achievements in the Burmese CP-led "revolutionary armed struggle," Peking's message dropped previous calls for continued armed resistance until total victory. It called only for the communists to continue "persevering in struggle"--a more flexible line that suggests Chinese willingness to support a political settlement between the Burmese party and the Rangoon government. Peking duly stressed its proletarian internationalist duty to support the Burmese "struggle," but dropped its specific support in 1969 for the "revolutionary armed struggle of the Burmese people."

A 16 August Moscow radio commentary promptly endeavored to exploit Peking's message as evidence of Chinese interference in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian states. Moscow also took pains to point up its view of the Ne Win government as a truly representative administration pursuing socialist economic policies that meet the needs of Burmese "patriots." The article criticized the Maoist-aligned Burmese CP for opposing Ne Win, charging that it was following a course of "Mao Tse-tung's adventurism and social chauvinism." In documenting Peking's alleged involvement in internal Burmese affairs, the commentary claimed that the Chinese are not only actively fomenting anti-Ne Win insurgency by minority peoples along the Sino-Burmese border but added that Chinese PLA personnel had recently entered into Burma to join with the insurgents in attacking government forces.

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## PANAMA-CUBA RELATIONS

## MOSCOW, HAVANA SEE DIPLOMATIC TIES AFFECTING U.S. INFLUENCE

Welcoming Panama's 22 August resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, Moscow has predictably seen it as a blow to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba and as portending an erosion of U.S. influence in Latin America. Havana, listing the Latin American countries which have re-established ties with Cuba and pointing to active Cuban participation in international conferences, has emphasized Cuba's growing prestige. Such developments, in Havana's eyes, indicate prospects for increasing Latin American solidarity with a concomitant reduction in U.S. influence in the region. Thus Castro has reiterated Cuban rejection of returning to the Organization of American States, and pointed to the need to form an all-Latin organization to supplant the OAS. At the same time, with the change of regime in the United States, Castro has indicated expectations of a revision in American policy toward Cuba.

MOSCOW In limited reaction to the Panamanian decision, Moscow in Spanish-language broadcasts has seen the trend toward renewed Latin American ties with Cuba as foreshadowing the end of the U.S. embargo policy. A 23 August radio commentary noted that Panama was the eighth Latin American country to re-establish relations with Cuba which had been broken off "due to pressure from U.S. imperialist forces." Remarking that several Latin American nations were calling for the repeal of the "notorious" OAS resolutions on Cuba, Moscow concluded that the blockade of the island "in by all accounts on its last legs." In another Spanish-language broadcast on the 23d, Leonid Levchenko stated that although "there are forces within the Western Hemisphere which seek to arrest the process of rapprochement between the Latin American countries and Cuba," their efforts seem increasingly futile. Likening the U.S. reliance on the OAS embargo of Cuba to a drowning man grasping at a straw, Levchenko predicted that "it may be that the very creators of the policy of isolating Cuba will find themselves isolated from Latin America."

Pointing up criticism of Washington's Cuba policy within the United States, TASS on the 24th promptly reported, without comment, a New York TIMES editorial advocating an end to the United States' "bankrupt

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policy" of boycotting Cuba.\* A PRAVDA article summarized by TASS on the 26th seemed to be approving Panama's independent stance in deciding to re-establish relations with Cuba and in maintaining a firm stand in dealings with the United Brands company. PRAVDA observed that "support for anti-imperialist solidarity in Latin America should grow in conjunction with the increase in resistance to the policy of North American capital."

HAVANA Fidel Castro, in a 26 August interview with Panamanian newsmen following resumption of relations with Panama, indicated that the new circumstances seemed to favor a change in the U.S. attitude toward Cuba. He stated his standard precondition for negotiations with Washington--the end of the American economic blockade. However, he admitted noticing a "growing trend in various U.S. circles in favor of civilizing" U.S. policy toward Cuba. Castro said that now that Richard Nixon had left the White House, he expected U.S. policy on Cuba to be "revised in the future," and even added that he expected "some changes may take place in September."

As for inter-American relations, Castro reiterated the position that Cuba was "not even remotely considering returning to the OAS." He indicated sympathy, as other Cuban comment has done, for Panamanian struggles over the canal and with the United Brands company, expressing support for Panamanian efforts to "eradicate the Canal Zone enclave." As for the banana conflict, Castro said that although Cubans were not regular consumers of "this great fruit," Cuba would, if necessary, "acquire important quantities of bananas from Panama to help it in this struggle."

Along the same lines, a 24 August GRANMA article had noted Cuba's solidarity with Panama in the latter's conflict with "the Yankee transnationals--ITT and the banana companies" and recalled the support which Cuba gave to the Panamanian position on the canal at the 1973 UN Security Council meeting in Panama. The canal, GRANMA added, "is a Yankee colony in the heart of Panama. It is a dagger piercing Panama's heart."

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\* Moscow comment since Brezhnev's 28 January-3 February visit to Havana has from time to time implied Soviet support for normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, drawing favorable attention to statement by U.S. public figures urging a change in U.S. policy. See the 13 February 1974 TRENDS, page 16, and the 13 March 1974 TRENDS, page 17.

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## U S S R

## SHAKEUP IN "QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY" EDITORIAL BOARD

An extensive shakeup in the editorial board of the liberal-leaning journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY disclosed in the July issue marks the latest move in the long-standing vendetta against rebellious philosophers waged by S.P. Trapeznikov, Stalinist head of the Central Committee's science section. Judging by the available evidence, the move can be rated as only a partial success, at best, from Trapeznikov's standpoint. Although the shakeup was clearly intended to rein in the troublesome journal by making its editorial board more conservative, the failure to remove outspoken chief editor I.T. Frolov, as well as some other liberal board members, indicates that Frolov still enjoys some protection in the leadership. Five board members were dropped, including Frolov's chief deputy, and nine were added, including a close subordinate of Trapeznikov. However, since those dropped included foes as well as friends of Frolov, and since those added included apparent liberals as well as conservatives, Frolov is still far from isolated on the board.

The shakeup in QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY follows an investigation of the journal's work--apparently stimulated by Trapeznikov--which was discussed at a 5 February session in the Institute of Philosophy presided over by Frolov's mentor B.M. Kedrov. The discussion, noting "alarm" in Trapeznikov's section over the journal's treatment of subjects such as dialectical materialism, nevertheless let Frolov off with mild criticism. Shortly afterwards, however, Kedrov was forced to resign as director of the institute.\*

The editorial board changes occurred during June and were announced in the July issue, which was signed to press 16 July. Although such changes are usually executed without comment, the journal in this case offered the ironic explanation that "in conformity with the established procedure of periodic renewal of editorial collegia of journals," the Academy of Sciences Presidium had confirmed a new editorial board for QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY. Dropped from the board were three apparently sympathetic to Frolov--deputy chief editor M.K. Mamardashvili, and moderate sociologists Yu. A. Zamoshkin and B.A. Grushin--and two foes--conservative philosophers P.N. Fedoseyev and M.B. Mitin.

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\* See the TRENDS of 24 July 1974, pages 31-32.

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Mamardashvili had been head of a section at the Institute of the International Workers Movement when he was added to the journal's board in July 1968, one month after Frolov had become chief editor. Named deputy chief editor in August 1968, he has served as Frolov's deputy for almost six years. Like Mamardashvili, Zamoshkin is from the Institute of the International Workers Movement, where he heads a sector. Grushin has been more clearly identified with well-known liberal figures involved in progressive social science trends. Organizing public opinion polls for the youth paper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, he became one of the country's leading pollsters in the early 1960's. He headed the Institute of Philosophy's sector for studying public opinion in 1966, and when liberal economist A.M. Rumyantsev organized the Institute for Concrete Social Research in 1968, Grushin became head of a sector and then of a section in the institute. He appeared to defend some deviant sociologists during the 1969-70 attacks on the sociologists by conservatives and left the institute after conservative M.N. Rutkevich replaced Rumyantsev as institute director in late 1971 and began a purge of liberals. Like Mamardashvili, he had joined the QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editorial board one month after Frolov became chief editor in June 1968. In contrast, Mitin is an old Stalinist philosopher clearly hostile to Frolov, while Academy of Sciences Vice President Fedoseyev in recent years has joined conservatives in attacking liberal philosophers and sociologists.

Added to the board were:

- A.F. Poltoratskiy, new deputy chief editor;
- L.I. Grukov, responsible secretary of the editorial board;
- B.S. Ukraintsev, director of the Institute of Philosophy;
- M.T. Iovchuk, rector of the Academy of Social Sciences;
- G. Ye. Glezerman, prorector of the Academy of Social Sciences;
- S.R. Mikulinskiy, director of the Institute of History of Natural Science and Technology;
- M.E. Omelyanovskiy, head of the Institute of Philosophy's section of philosophical questions of natural science;
- M.F. Ovsyannikov, head of the Institute of Philosophy's esthetics sector; and
- N.V. Pilipenko, head of the sector for philosophy and scientific communism of the Central Committee's science and educational institutions section.

The new additions include some who appear to be aligned against Frolov and some who may side with him. The ideological inclination of new deputy editor Poltoratskiy, an obscure philosopher, is unknown, but Ukraintsev, who recently succeeded outspoken liberal

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Kedrov as director of the Institute of Philosophy, appears to be more conservative and not overly friendly to Frolov.\* Pilipenko has served as Trapeznikov's supervisor of philosophy since at least 1969 and presumably is closely involved in Trapeznikov's longstanding efforts to crack down on Frolov. Philosopher Glezerman participated in the 1969-71 campaign against liberal sociologists.

On the other hand, Mikulinskiy is presumably a moderate, having served as deputy director of the Institute of History of Natural Science and Technology for 10 years (1963-73) under Kedrov, while Iovchuk, though appearing more cautious and orthodox, was associated with some of the initiatives of Kedrov and Frolov.\*\* In a July HERALD OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES article on the history of Soviet philosophy, Iovchuk recalled the suppression of quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, cybernetics, psychology and genetics under Stalin and wrote that since the late 1930's philosophical thought had developed "despite the negative influence of a number of schematic and onesided theses" in Stalin's writings on dialectical materialism. Grekov's promotion to the board presumably is a gain for Frolov, since Grekov has been board secretary since at least 1971, working closely with Frolov. Thus, with the addition of Grekov, Iovchuk and Mikulinskiy and the retention of Kedrov on the board, Frolov is far from isolated.

#### MOSCOW MEETING DROPS "HEADED BY" BREZHNEV FORMULATION

For the first time since early this year a Moscow meeting has elected the Politburo as its honorary presidium without specifying "headed by" Brezhnev. This occurred at a 23 August miners' day ceremony reported in the 24 August PRAVDA and MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. The last time PRAVDA reported a meeting electing the Politburo without mentioning Brezhnev was on 13 February in covering a meeting in Siberia, while the last such occurrence in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA was in the paper's 18 January report on city rayon party elections.

The practise of referring to honorary presidiums as being comprised of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev began proliferating late

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\* See the TRENDS of 3 July 1974, pages 12-16.

\*\* See the TRENDS Supplement of 29 May 1974 "The Struggle for Change in Soviet Social Sciences," pages 2-4.

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last year and by early 1974 had become virtually uniform practise. As the number of meetings has slackened in midsummer, the reports of election of such honorary presidiums have ceased to be daily fare; however, they have remained frequent. In the last two months PRAVDA alone reported election of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev on 10, 13, 19, and 27 July and 3, 9, 10, and 17 August.

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## NOTES

PRC-DISARMAMENT: Peking NCNA on 21 August reported favorably on recent separate requests by Iran and Pakistan that the upcoming UN General Assembly discuss the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and in South Asia respectively. Previously, on 17 August, NCNA had replayed portions of a recent Iran-Romanian joint statement calling for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and the Balkans. The Chinese first began to moderate their reservations over nuclear-free zones last year, when they agreed to sign Additional Protocol II of the Tlatelolco treaty governing the Latin American nuclear-free zone.

KOREAN FRONT ANNIVERSARY: Comment on the 25 August fifth anniversary of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (RPR), the South Korean front organization based in the North, took a harsh tone toward the Pak government, reflecting the current deterioration in North-South relations. An RPR anniversary declaration broadcast by the clandestine Voice of the RPR on 21 August called directly for the "overthrow of the Pak Chong-hui regime," and RPR slogans issued on 25 August called for the overthrow of the "fascist dictatorship." Official DPRK media have not called for Pak's overthrow in their own name, but KCNA picked up the 21 August RPR declaration, and a 25 August NODONG SINMUN editorial article stated that RPR policy called for overthrowing the regime in the South. Calls for the overthrow of the Pak government first reappeared, though infrequently, in RPR media last fall, following student clashes with ROK authorities.

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# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 19 - 25 AUGUST 1974

<u>Moscow (2550 items)</u>			<u>Peking (942 items)</u>		
Cyprus Crisis	(8%)	13%	Romanian Liberation 30th Anniversary	(1%)	15%
[Soviet Government Statement 22 August	(--)	4%]	Seventh Asian Games, Teheran	(--)	9%
China	(5%)	9%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(1%)	7%
Romanian Liberation 30th Anniversary	(1%)	8%	UN World Population Conference, Bucharest	(--)	5%
French Liberation 30th Anniversary	(--)	3%	Vietnam	(1%)	2%
Chile	(3%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.